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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRISCO JOES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, DONALD VAUGHN 
TOLMAN and JOANNA TOLMAN, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants , 
v. 
ELLIS Y. PEAY, GORDON HALL 
and KENNETH HOSTETTER, 
Defendants-
Respondents, 
Case No. 14,515 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASS 
This is an action for damages arising out of the forcible 
entry of the plaintiffs' leased premises by the lessor, defendant 
Ellis Peay. It is also an action for conversion of the personal 
property which was located in the building on the leased premises. 
The conversion claim was made against all of the defendants. Defen-
dant Peay counter-claimed for rent allegedly due and unpaid. 
Defendants Hall and Hostetter counter-claimed against the plaintiff 
and cross-claimed against defendant Peay to quiet title to the 
personal property in question. Hall and Hostetter also cross-
claimed against Peay for indemnification in the event any judgment 
should be entered against them. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, Judge J. Robert Bullock, presiding, dismissed 
all claims with prejudice except that it entered judgment for 
$1,250.0 0 for the defendant Peay against the plaintiff for the 
past due rent and made no decision concerning the ownership of 
the personal property in question. 
RELIEF SOUGHT CN APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have this Court reverse the trial court 
and enter judgment against the defendants in the amount prayed 
for the forcible entry by the defendant Peay and for the wrongful 
conversion of the plaintiffs' personal property by all of the de-
fendants. Plaintiffs also seek to have the award of past due 
rent reduced from $1250.00 to $554.80 as reflective of the actual 
past due rent. 
In the alternative, appellants ask that this Court reverse 
the trial court with regard to the forcible entry and conversion 
issues and to remand the case to the trial court for a determination 
of the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. Appellants also seek 
the other relief listed cibove, as well as attorney's fees and the 
costs of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In late December of 1974, Donald and Joanna Tolman purchased 
all of the interest in Frisco Joe's, Inc., a corporation whose 
sole activity has been the management of a restaurant in Prove, 
Utah, which bore the name of the corporation. The business 
maintained the restaurant on leased premises which were owned, by 
the defendant Ellis Peay. As part of the 19 74 purchase, the 
Tolmans purchased trade fixtures and other expensive personal 
property, which were placed in the restaurant. 
Donald Tolman negotiated a new lease of the property with 
the defendant Peay, dated January 1, 1975. The terms of that 
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lease provided that Tolman would pay $400.00 per month rent, 
beginning on January 1, 19 75. The provisions of the lease provide 
that a five day notice-to-quit may be given if the rent is more 
than fifteen days delinquent. The lease also provided for a 
$450.00 payment on March 15, 1975, as a deposit for the last 
month's rent. Tolman made the January rent payment but did not 
make the February or March payments. 
Because the business was unprofitable, Tolman closed it and 
began looking for a purchaser with the help of a real estate 
agency. On March 5, 19 76, Tolman had a discussion with defendant 
Peay, the contents of which are disputed. In any event, Tolman 
continued in peaceful possession of the premises until March 12, 
19 75. On that date, Peay entered the premises and had a locksmith 
come to change the locks on the building, thus excluding the 
plaintiff from possession of the premises and the personal property 
within the building. Peay alleges that the lock-chainging was 
done for the purposes of security but never explains the failure 
to provide the plaintiffs v/ith a key to the premises. 
Respondents Hall and Hostetter subsequently leased the 
premises from defendant Peay and purportedly entered into a 
purchase contract for the personal property. In early April of 
1975, plaintiff Tolman informed both Hall and Hostetter that he 
owned the personal property in the restaurant. They responded by 
stating that they had purchased it from Peay and that Tolman 
would have to solve any problems with him (Peay). 
The defendants have never returned any of the personal 
property belonging to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs have 
never regained possession of the premises. 
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
Appellants' contention on appeal is that the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in failing to find that the above facts 
constituted forcible entry by the defendant Peay and conversion 
by all of the defendants. Appellants believe that the Utah law 
on these two subjects is clear and that the trial court was 
simply incorrect in its holding. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT 
PEAY WAS GUILTY OF FORCIBLY ENTRY, 
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in applying 
the applicable Utah law of forcible entry to the facts as proven 
by the clear weight of the evidence at trial. The evidence 
showed that respondent Ellis Peay took possession of the leased 
property v/ithout the appellants1 permission or without following 
the legal requirements of Utah's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, 
U.C.A. § 78-36-1, et seq. Appellants believe that the error 
complained of in this appeal occurred in applying the pertinent 
law to the facts in this case. 
Utah law has clearly defined the method by which a landlord 
may dispossess a tenant whom he believes to be in arrears on his 
rent payments. As stated in Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western 
States Wholesale Supply, 22 L\2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 (1969), the 
"forcible entry and detainer statute (§ 78-36-3, U.C.A., 1953) 
provides a speedy and adequate remedy against a tenant who wrong-
fully is in possession of land.1' Pax ton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 
45 P.2d 903, 906 (1935) established that the forcible detainer 
statute is the only alternative action open to a landlord other 
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than voluntary surrender of possession by the tenant: 
Even rightful owners should not take the law into 
their own hands and proceed to recover possession by 
violence, or by entry in the nighttime, or during the 
absence of the occupants of any real property. 
Even contractual provisions between the parties do not over-
ride the requirements of proceeding in a court of law. In King v. 
Firm, 3 Utah2d 419, 285 P.2d 114, (1955) the lease under which 
the case arose contained a provision giving the landlord the right 
of re-entry upon the tenant's default in rent payment without 
making a demand upon the tenant. The court held that the landlord 
could still not dispossess the tenant without his express permission: 
Utah has enacted Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Statutes and a landlord may not without the express 
consent of a tenant repossess his property without 
resorting to remedies provided in those statutes. 
Id, at 1118. 
In Petersen v. Piatt, 16 Utah2d 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965), the 
rule was stated even more clearly in the court's holding that 
dispossession, unless consentual, must be effected by the statutory 
means. That case, which is almost exactly indentical to this 
one, clearly shows that the defendant, Peay, was guilty of wrong-
ful entry when he entered the premises, had the locks changed, 
and took possession without permission. The law of the case, 
which was overlooked by the trial court in this case, is clearly 
stated: 
Our previous decisions construing our forcible 
entry and detainer statute place a duty on a 
person whether entitled to the real property in 
question or not, to not use force or stealth or 
fraud in obtaining possession of such realty. 
Such forcible entry and detainer statute 
creates a right in a person who is in actual 
peaceable possession, of such real property to a 
cause of action against a person who, in his 
absence, and without legal process, by force, 
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stealth or fraud, takes the possession of such 
property from him. Id, at 400 P. 2d 50 8., 
Despite the attempts at trial to justify Peay's behavior, it is 
crystal clear under Utah law that the acts of the defendant Peay, 
in dispossessing the plaintiffs of the leased premises, constituted 
forcible entry as defined in Utah statute and case law. 
As seen by the Delaware Court in Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 
711, 713 (1972), such statutes abrogate the common law right to 
expel a holdover tenant without legal process: 
The common law rule that the landlord may expel 
holdover tenants without process appears still to 
be followed in several states. That appears to 
have been the early rule in Delaware. State v. 
Stansborough, 1 Del.Cas 129 and 428 (1797). 
More recently, however, the courts of many states 
have held that the enactment of forcible entry 
and detainer statutes has modified the common 
law and that the landlord, in order to dispossess 
a tenant, must proceed by the statutes. Failure 
to. proceed by such means may result in the land-
lord being liable to the tenant in damages. See, 
for example, Petersen v. Piatt, 16 U.2d 3 30, 400 
P.2d 507 (1965); 'Aramo 6 ALR "3d 177 (1966). 
The Utah Forcible Entry Statute has thus been clearly establishes 
as being the exclusive alternative to consentual surrender of 
leased or rented premises. The elements and universal scope of 
the statute were emphasized in Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western 
States Wholesale Supply, 22 Utah2d 266, 451 P.2d 778, 781, (1969): 
It says that "every person" who does certain things 
is guilty of forcible entry, etc. There is no 
exception in the statute for one who may by contract 
be authorized to enter, or for an owner who as a mat-
ter of lav/ may have a right to the possession. 
The facts in this Cc2.se clearly support a finding of forcible 
entry. The terms of the lease provided for re-entry in case of 
default in rent payment only with five days written notice. 
...upon five (5) days written notice of such default 
by the Lessor to the Lessees, the Lessor shall 
/* 
— o -
have the right to re-enter or re-possess the leased 
property,.. (Ex.11.). 
It was never claimed at trial by defendant Peay that the five day 
written notice was given; in fact he admitted he did not give 
that notice. (R. 237). Thus, the repossession cannot be justified 
under the terms of the lease, even if that were permitted under 
the Forcible Entry Statute. 
Nor can the repossession be justified by a claim of surrender 
of the lease. There is no evidence of an express surrender, and 
evidence is inadequate to support a finding of a surrender by 
operation of law. No tangible evidence of an intent to surrender 
exists. The defendant Peay only alleges that there was an offer 
to turn over the keys to the premises by Mr. Tolman. Those keys 
were never delivered. Had a surrender truly been effected, there 
would have been no need to change the locks and exclude the 
rightful possessors. 
The standard by which a claim of surrender must be measured 
in Utah was set in Mariani Air Products v. Gill's Tire Market, 29 
Utah2d 291, 508 P.2d 808, 810, (1973): 
a surrender will not be implied against the in-
tent of the parties, as manifested by their acts... 
The burden is on the party, relying on a surrender 
of a lease, to prove it; and the proof must be clear 
where the surrender is to be inferred from circum-
stances inconsistent with the intention to perform. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The only evidence that would support a surrender by operation 
of law was given by Peay in his statement that Tolman was going 
to turn the keys over to him. (R. 275). However, the keys, a 
traditional emblem of surrender of a lease, were never transferred. 
In that same part of his testimony, Peay indicated that he would 
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not accept a surrender of the lease when he recalled his saying 
to Tolman: 
..•you are still on the lease and as long as we 
don't have it leased to somebody else you are re-
sponsible for the lease on it. (R. 275). 
Mr. Tolmanfs testimony shows that his intent was not to effect a 
surrender, but merely to enlist Mr. Peay's help in effecting a 
sale of his business and an assigment of the lease. Peay also 
indicated in his testimony that he v/as going to help Tolman lease 
the premises; 
I said "All right, you take the keys and keep 
them then, and as soon as you are through with 
them I want you to bring them back to me so that 
I can show it when these people come to rent it. 
(R. 275). 
The intent of both parties is thus made clear that there was no 
surrender intended, and that the lease was regarded by both as of 
full force. 
Since there was no consentual surrender of the premises by 
the tenants, the landlord's remedy is to proceed through the 
forcible entry and detainer statute to regain possession. This 
was not done. Instead, Peay changed the locks on the building 
and made a new lease with defendants Hall and Hostetter. (R. 236). 
Peay is thus clearly guilty of a forcible entry under the statute. 
His actions constitute a forcible entry by stealth under the Utah 
statute. 
Cases where dispossession has been effected by the changing 
of locks are numerous in other jurisdictions, and those instances 
have been found to be forcible entries, even under statutes 
lacking the forcible entry by stealth provision. California has 
found entry with a key or by a locksmith to be forcible in many 
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cases. See Karp v. Margolis-, 159 CA2d 69, 323 P.2d 557 (1958) 
and Winchester v. Becker, 4DA 382, 88 P. 296 (1906). 
In the absence of any evidence establishing consentual 
surrender of the premises, noting that the provisions of the 
lease for repossession were not met, it is clear that Mr. Peay's 
taking control of the premises was a forcible entry by stealth 
under U.C.A. § 76-36-1. 
The damages following such action are easily predictable. 
Without an interest in the property, it would be practically 
impossible to sell the personal property or the business itself 
for any amount approximating the fair market value. This is 
accentuated by the difference in prices cited by Tolman at the 
trial. (R. 219). 
For the above reasons, appellants believe it is obvious that 
defendant Peay forcibly entered the premises possessed by the 
plaintiffs and did so without legal right or justification. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY OF THE PLAINTIFFS WAS CONVERTED BY ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
The Utah law of conversion has been succinctly summarized in 
Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958): 
A conversion is an act of willful interference 
with a chattel, done without lawful justification 
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived 
of its use and possession. The measure of damages 
of conversion is the full value of the property. 
For a conversion to be found, there must be a willful interference 
with the possession and use of a chattel. "Willful" is defined 
as meaning a conscious act and 'interference' means an act so 
serious that the party so converting may be required to, in 
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effect, purchase the goods. 
The evidence was clear in this case that Peay assumed control 
of the goods allegedly converted. Peay admitted that the equipment 
and furnishings associated with the business were still in the 
building at the time he changed the locks. (R. 292). Defendant 
Hall also testified that he understood Peay owned the property 
when he and.Hostetter purchased the property: 
Mr. Lewis Did you purport to be purchasing that 
Property? 
Mr. Hall We thought that was part of the building. 
(R. 243, 244). 
• • • • • • 
Mr. Hall He was selling us the property as listed 
in this agreement. I don't recall if he 
came right out in the words "1 own the 
property," but in the agreement it said 
that he was selling it to us. (R. 257). 
Of course, Mr. Peay's action in changing the locks on the 
building wrongfully deprived Tolman of his rightful use and 
possession of the furnishings and equipment insider. As Tolman 
testified, it was also impossible for him to show the premises to 
prospective buyers of his business. (R. 213). Peay further 
deprived Mr. Tolman of the use and possession of his property by 
selling it to Hall and Hostetter. A check drawn on their account 
was given to Peay to cover an "equipment payment" of $200.00. 
Peay admitted receiving the payment for the equipment. (R. 237, 
Ex. 14). 
Peay claims he did not know of Mr* Tolman*s interest in the 
property at the time he 'sold' it to Hall and Hostetter and that 
as soon as he became aware of his interest, he had them deal 
directly with the Restaurant Stores and Equipment Co. However, 
under Utah law, even a bona fide seller of property is guilty of 
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conversion. As stated in Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah2d at 76, 328 
P.2d at 729 (1958): 
A purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer who 
sells them in good faith becomes a converter since 
his acts are an interference with the control of the 
property or in other words, a claiming of the owner-
ship in such property and taking it out of the 
possession of someone else with intention of excer-
cising dominion over it is a conversion. 
The essence of conversion is the interference with the property 
of another, not the state of mind of the one claiming dominion 
over the property. Therefore, Hall and Hostetter are also guilty 
of a conversion by reason of the same transaction. 
Thus a bona fide purchaser of goods for value from 
one who has no right to sell them becomes a con-
verter when he takes possession of such goods. 
Supra, at 729. 
Conversion of the furnishings and equipment owned by Mr. Tolman 
was made by Peay when he interfered with Tolman fs use and possession 
by locking him out of the building, and conversion was made by 
Hall and Hostetter when they purchased and took possession of the 
property in the transaction with Peay. Peay's conduct was wrongful 
in that he gained possession of the premises and property by a 
wrongful eviction. 
The defendants maintained at the trial that some sort of 
formal demand is required in order to allege conversion. It is 
well established that no demand is necessary as a condition 
precedent to a suit for conversion when the original taking of 
the property is wrongful. 
Generally, demand and refusal are unnecessary when 
the act of the defendant amounts to a conversion 
regardless of whether a demand is made. Thus, no 
demand is necessary when the conversion results from 
the defendant's securing possession of the property 
illegally or tortiously... 13 AmJur.2d Conversion § 63. 
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No demand is necessary for the cause of action to accrue against 
Mr. Peay; it accrued when he wrongfully excluded Mr. Tolman from 
the leased property, and thus from his personal property. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Hall and Mr. Hostetter were bona fide purchasers 
for value, a demand is necessary for a suit to be brought against 
them, with a refusal on thier part. 
When there has been no wrongful taking or disposal 
of the goods, and the defendant has merely come 
rightfully into possession and then refused to sur-
render them, demand and refusal are necessary to 
the existence of the tort. William Prosser, Law 
of Torts, 89. 
That the required demand was made of them, and that there 
was a refusal to deliver the property was made is established by 
testimony at the trial. (R. 107-109). 
Because the defendants willfully interfered with the chattels 
of the plaintiffs within the legal meaning of those terms, the 
trial court erroneously denied plaintiffs1 claims for conversion. 
Because the facts produced at trial, including the admissions of 
the defendants, clearly show conversion, the plaintiffs are 
entitled to judgment from the defendant for the fair market value 
of the property, which is the proper remedy under Utah law. 
POINT III 
THE AWARD OF $1,250.00 FOR DELINQUENT RENT WAS EXCESSIVE. 
The terms of the lease agreement provided for payments of 
$400.00 per month during the year 1975. The monthly payment was 
to increase to $450.00 for the year 1976, and, consistent with 
that provision, a payment for last month's rent was to become due 
on March 15, 1975. 
The Lessees shall pay to the Lessor during the 
original term of this lease... 
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Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) on or before the 
1st day of January, 1975, the receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged, and $400.00 on or before 
the first day of each month thereafter during the 
entire year 1975... 
Provided further that on or before the 15th day 
of March, 1975, the Lessees shall pay to the Lessor 
$450.00 which shall constitute payment for the 
last monthfs rent under the terms of this lease. 
(Ex. 11.) 
That the first payment for January 19 75 was made is attested 
to in the lease itself. Tolman testified at the trial that he 
had made the payment, and Peay also testified that he received 
that payment. ( See Record 208, 273). The trial court found 
that that payment had been made. (R. 11). 
The February payment was not made, again established by the 
testimony of both Tolman and Peay. (R. 102, 168). The same 
testimony also established that a March payment was not made. 
Mr. Tolmanfs liability for the March rent, however, was affected 
by Peay's actions denying him access to the premises. Evidence 
established that Mr. Tolman was denied access to the premises on 
March 12, 19 75 by Mr. Peay, who had the locks changed. Mr. Tolman 
and Mr. Peay both agreed on this in their testimony. (R. 213, 
216, 2 77). The court's conclusion is consistent with that evidence 
in finding the locks were changed as of that date. 
Mr. Tolman is not liable for rent for the period following 
his dispossession inasmuch as he was wrongfully excluded from the 
premises. It is a rule of long standing (see Hyman v. Jockey Club, 
9 Colo.App. 299, 48 P. 671 (1897) that a tenant is not liable for 
rent remaining in an unexpired term when there has been a v/rongful 
eviction. 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant, §§ 323, 329. Had the 
rent for March been paid, the tenant Tolman could have maintained 
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an action in tort to recover the pro rata rent for the unexpired 
term. Tolman should thus be liable for 12/31 of the March rent 
of $400.00; or $154.80. 
On his counterclaim, defendant Peay was also awarded $450.00 
as the amount due on March 15, 19 76 as a last month's rent. This 
would be duplicative of any amount awarded for March inasmuch as 
March was the last month the lease was in effect. The award of 
$450.00 as a last month's rent was clearly erroneous as being 
duplicative. The award of that amount was also improper since 
that liability did nto accrue until the 15th of March, three days 
after the effective termination of the lease. Regardless of the 
propriety of the eviction on the 12th, it is the rule that any 
eviction suspends liability for rents accruing after the eviction. 
49 Am.Jur2d Landlord & Tenant, § 5 75. As ahs been said by the 
Colorado court: 
It is well settled that termination of the lease 
agreement of eviction of the tenant by the land-
lord relieves the tenant from all liabilities to 
accrue in the future including rent... MacArthur 
v. Rostek, 483 P.2d 1351 (Colo.App. 1971). 
The termination of the tenant's possession relieves him of further 
liabilities to the landlord if that dispossession has been caused 
by the landlord. Here it is clear and admitted that Mr. Tolman 
did not have access to the premises after the 12th of March when 
the landlord (Peay) changed the locks on the building. There 
should not be any liability for payments accruing after that 
date. The reasoning behind the rule is simply the application of 
the principle of quid pro quo. 
The rule follows the general principle that any 
act of the landlord which results in dispossessing 
the tenant and which deprives him of the use, oc-
cupancy, and enjoyment of the premises amounts to 
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an eviction. The reason for the rule is that the 
rent is the landlord's right to receive from the 
tenant compensation for the benefits that are ac-
cruing to the tenant from his possession and enjoy-
ment of land, and that when the tenant is deprived 
of this right of possession and enjoyment by the 
action of the landlord to receive compensation 
automatically ceases# Telegraph Ave. Corp. v. 
Raentsch, 269 P. 1109, 1112', (Cal. S. C. 1928). 
It is clear that any finding that established that Mr. Tolman 
was excluded from the premises as of March 12, 19 75 demands that 
no liability be placed on him for rents accruing after that date. 
The same effect would occur if a surrender of the lease was 
found. Petersen v. Hodges, 239 21 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951). 
In summary, liability for February, 19 75, may be imposed in 
the amount of $400.00. For March, 1975, the amount owing would 
be $154.80. Rent is not due for the remainder fo March due to 
Mr, Peayfs wrongful eviction of Mr. Tolman. The payment which 
would, have accrued on the 15th of March is not collectible because 
the payment would duplicate the payment for March rent anci also 
because that liability had not accrued when possession was denied 
Tolman. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact of this case clearly show that the defendant Peay 
was guilty of forcible entry and that all of the defendants 
converted the personal property of the plaitniffs. Appellants 
believe that the clear weight of the evidence at trial showed the 
requisite facts to establish these causes of action and that the 
trial court simply erred in applying Utah law to the facts. 
Because of the clarity of the law and because the defendants1 
acts clearly fit within the limits of the behavior prohibited by 
that law, appellants ask that this Court reverse the trial court 
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and enter judgment as previously set forth in this brief. 
Respectfully submitted this /jy day fo June, 19 76. 
& / # 
S. R2X LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD/LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
to Cullen Y. Christensen, Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, Defendant-
Respondent, 55 East Center Street, Provof Utah 84601; Boyd L. 
Park, Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, Defendant-Respondent, 80 
North 100 East, Provo, Utah 84601; and Richard L. Maxfield, 
Attorney for Gordon Hall and Kenneth Hostetter, Defendant-Respondents 
P. O. Box 1097, Provo, Utah 84601, this //y^ day of June, 1976. 
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